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Specializing in tourism is an option available to a number of less developed countries and 
regions. But is it a good option? To answer this question, we have compared the relative 
growth performance of 14 “tourism countries” within a sample of 143 countries, observed 
during the period 1980-95. Using standard OLS cross-country growth regressions, we have 
documented that the tourism countries grow significantly faster than all the other sub-groups 
considered in our analysis (OECD, Oil, LDC, Small). Moreover, we have shown that the 
reason why they are growing faster is neither that they are poorer than the average; nor that 
they have particularly high saving/investment propensities; nor that they are very open to 
trade. In other words, the positive performance of the tourism countries is not significantly 
accounted for by the traditional growth factors of the Mankiw, Romer and Weil type of 
models. Tourism specialization appears to be an independent determinant. 
A corollary of our findings is that the role played by the tourism sector should not be ignored 
by the debate about whether smallness is harmful for growth (e.g. Easterly and Kraay (2000), 
who conclude that there is no growth disadvantage in smallness). Half of the thirty countries 
classified as microstates in this literature are heavily dependent on tourism. Once this 
distinction is adopted, it is easy to see that the small tourism countries perform much better 
than the remaining small countries. In our findings, smallness per se can be bad for growth, 
while the opposite is true when smallness goes together with a specialization in tourism. 
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1. Introduction  
In a recent paper, Easterly and Kraay (2000) investigate whether being small represents an 
economic disadvantage for a country. Are smaller countries poorer than average? Do they 
grow more slowly?  Reasons for being pessimistic are not difficult to find in the literature, 
especially in endogenous growth, where scale effects often play a role in the determination of 
an economy’s growth rate (Grossman and Helpman (1991); Aghion and Howitt (1998)).  
Similarly, countries that rely strongly on international tourism also are suspected of 
being locked in a slow growth path. Again, endogenous growth theories tend to emphasize the 
virtues of high-tech sectors, the potential for high long-run growth of which are regarded as 
more promising than those of non high-tech service sectors such as tourism.2  
In addition, countries in which tourism is the prominent sector are often very small 
(see below).3  So, expectations about their economic performance are not high, to say the least. 
 Are these pessimistic expectations supported by the international evidence?  This 
question is especially important for developing countries: in a number of cases, tourism is an 
available option in countries where large gaps in other, more technological and less resource-
based sectors have been accumulated.4  In this paper we assess whether tourism is a good 
growth option looking at the cross-country evidence.  
We will use Easterly and Kraay (2000) as a benchmark against which to compare our 
results. Using a 1960-95 dataset on 157 countries, they find that being small is not an 
economic disadvantage. As far as the growth performance is concerned, our paper amends this 
view significantly. We find that, in the period 1980-95 (we do not have comparable cross-
country data on tourism for 1960-79), tourism specialization does affect growth positively. A 
corollary of this is that being small is far from being a disadvantage if tourism is a key sector 
of the economy; if not, smallness turns out to be a disadvantage.   
Our evidence on the positive relative performance of small tourism countries poses 
further interesting questions concerning the economic mechanisms that lie behind it. Is this 
performance either temporary or sustainable? Is it based on an increasing (perhaps 
unsustainable) exploitation of the environment that attracts the tourists? Is it based on a 
“terms of trade effect” that makes the value of that environment increase significantly over 
time? In this paper we define and discuss a number of alternative explanations, all compatible 
with our evidence. To test them empirically, a much more detailed cross-country dataset than 
                                                 
2 On the growth perspectives of tourism countries see Coopeland (1991), Hazari and Sgro (1995), Lanza 
and Pigliaru (1994), (2000a,b). 
3 On the relationship between smallness and tourism specialization, see Liu and Jenkins (1996), and 
Candela and Cellini (1997). 
4 See Sinclair (1998). 
  2the one currently available to us would be required. We leave this latter task to future stages 
of our research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our data and 
variables. In section 3 we give a first picture of the relative performance of the various groups 
of countries. In section 4 the econometric evidence is presented. In section 5 we describe the 
degree of heterogeneity in growth performance within the STCs group. In section 6 we discuss 
various alternative explanations of our empirical results. Concluding remarks are in section 7. 
 
 
2. Data and definitions 
Following Easterly and Kraay (2000) (E-K from now on), we define small countries as 
countries with an average population of less than one million during 1960-95. In the original 
paper by E-K, 33 countries out of a total of 157 met this condition. 
The E-K dataset is our starting point. To investigate the relative economic performance 
of countries specialised in tourism, we need cross-country data on international tourism 
receipts.5  The first year for which data are available is 1980, and not for all the countries 
listed in the E-K dataset.  As a consequence, the resulting dataset – the one we will use in this 
paper – is smaller in both the time and the cross-section dimensions: the period covered is 
1980-95, and 143 countries instead of the original 157 are included, with the sub-set of small 
countries diminishing from 33 to 29.  
Let us now turn to the definition of “tourism country”. In what follows, the degree of 
tourism specialization is defined by the ratio of international tourist receipts to GDP (data 
sources are listed in the Appendix). In Table 1 we list all countries in our dataset with a 
degree of tourism specialization greater than 10% on average over the period 1980-95. Such a 
characteristic is shared by 17 countries; of these, 14 meet our adopted definition of small state 
(the exceptions are Jordan, Singapore and Jamaica, all with populations exceeding one 
million). 
The remaining 15 small countries, the degree of tourism specialization of which is 
smaller than 10%, are listed in Table 2 below. So, the sub-sample of 29 small countries in our 
dataset is split into two almost identical parts: 14 countries are above the 10% tourism share 
of GDP and 15 are below it. 
                                                 
5 International tourism receipts are defined as: expenditures by international inbound visitors, 
including payments to national carriers for international transport. These receipts should include any 
other prepayments made for goods or services received in the destination country. They may also 
include receipts from same-day visitors, except in cases where these are so important as to justify a 
separate classification. Data are in current U.S. dollars. For more information, see WDI table 6.14. 
Source: WBD Indicators 2000. 






















St. Kitts and Nevis  35.0 
St. Lucia  40.9 
Bahamas, The  41.2 
Maldives 60.8 
       
      [* Not small countries] 
 
 














Cape Verde  1.8 
Djibouti 1.2 
Gabon 0.2 




























  43. Small tourism countries and comparative economic performance 
In this section we consider the growth performance of the small tourism countries (STCs from 
now on) as a whole, relative to the performance of a number of significant sub-sets of countries 
– namely, OECD, Oil, Small (as defined above), and LDCs.6  An assessment of the degree of 
economic heterogeneity within the tourism countries sub-set is postponed to section 5 below. 
Before analysing the relative growth performance of each group, let us consider for a 
moment the more general picture. Figure 1 shows the time path of per capita GDP in the 
OECD countries as a group. The period 1980-1995 is a period of relatively slow growth, due to 
the existence of two sub-periods of very slow or even negative growth (at the beginning of the 
1980s and of the 1990s). As a result, the annual average growth rate in the OECD group is 
1.6% per year. The average growth rate of the whole sample is much lower than this, at 0.4% 
per year – an outcome mainly due to the poor performance of the Oil (15 countries, growing on 
average at -2.5% per year) and the LDC groups (37 countries, growing on average at –0.5% per 
year).  
This picture is in sharp contrast to what had characterized the previous two decades, 
when the average annual growth rate in the sample was about 2.6%, and all groups were 
performing rather well (more on this presently). 
 
 
                                          Figure 1. OECD, Real per capita GDP  
                                               in constant dollars (international prices, 1985) 
 
 
Let us now move to the relative performances of the individual groups. Table 3 shows 
the average growth rates for all groups in 1980-95. First of all, the average small country (SC) 
grows faster than the average country in the sample, but slower than the average OECD 
country. Second, when we isolate the performance of STCs from that of the other small 
  5
                                                 
6 Countries in each group are listed in the Appendix. With the exception of LDC, the groups in our 
paper coincide with those used in Easterly and Kraay (2000).   countries, we see that tourism specialization is clearly beneficial for growth. This result is 
independent of the proportion of tourism receipts on GDP we adopt to classify a country as 
“tourism country”. Adopting 15% or 20% instead of 10% as the demarcation value would leave 
our results unaffected.   
Remarkably, the remaining 15 small countries with a share of tourism receipts in GDP 
lower than 10% show a negative average growth rate. The better than average growth 
performance of the SC group is due exclusively to the much better than average performance 
of the STCs.  
 
      Table 3 
 
Country group 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 80-95 
 
No. countries 
OECD  1.7 21 
Oil  -2.5 14 
Small  1.1 29 
Small Tur. >20%  2.3 10 
Small Tur. >10%  2.4 14 
Small <10%  -0.2 15 
LDCs  -0.5 37 
All  0.4 143 
 
 
Therefore, tourism specialization seems to be the key to understanding why small 
countries are not at disadvantage with respect to larger ones. Is this result a characteristic of 
the 1980-95 period only? We do not have data on tourism receipts for the years 1960-79, so we 
cannot answer this question directly. We can compare the performance of our groups of 
countries over two sub-periods (1960-80, 1980-95), but we have to bear in mind that, given the 
current limitation of the available data, the definition of STCs is based on the data of the 
second sub-period.  
To make this comparison, we have to take into account an additional problem, since the 
1960-80 sample is different from the 1980-95. The number of countries for which data are 
available for 1960-80 decreases to 136 from the original 143. What matters most from our 
point of view is that the number of STCs with an index for specialization >10% also decreases 
from 12 to 7. Consequently, the comparison shown in Table 4 below are based on the smaller 
sample of 136 countries. 
 


















OECD 2.6  3.2  1.7  -0.5  21 
Oil 0.3  2.6  -2.5  -2.0  14 
Small 2.1  3.1  0.8  -0.7  26 
Small Tur. > 10%  2.8  3.5  1.8  -0.5  9 
LDCs 0.2  1.0  -0.7  -1.7  34 
All 1.6  2.6  0.3  -0.9  136 
    
 
Two features shown in Table 4 are worth mentioning. First, STCs are the fastest 
growing group in 1960-80 too. Second, although their average growth rate slows down in the 
second sub-period, all the other groups do worse than the STCs, with the exception of the 
OECD. Notice that while the growth rates of SC and of STC are similar in the first sub-period, 
the STC rate is significantly higher than the SC one in the second sub-period. Again, the 




4. Econometric evidence 
We now turn to the econometric analysis of the relative growth performance of STCs. We first 
test whether in our dataset it is possible to detect significant advantages/disadvantages for 
SCs and STCs. To do this, we use the full set of continental dummies used in E-K, as well as 
dummies for Oil, OECD and LDC countries.  
  The picture that emerges from Table 5 strongly supports our findings in section 3. After 
controlling for continental location and other important characteristics, the above average 
growth performance of the SCc as a group (regression (1)) is crucially due to the performance 
of the tourism countries. Once the SC group is split in two using a demarcation value of 10%, 
STCs outperform the remaining small countries (regression (2)). 
   In regression (3) we add the LDC dummy as a further control, and in regression (4) we 
change the demarcation value of tourism specialization from 10% to 20%. The STC dummy 
stays significant at 1% in all regression.7 
  In Table 6 we test whether tourism specialization remains growth-enhancing after a 
number of traditional growth factors are taken into account. For instance, STCs might be on a 
                                                 
7 The same result is obtained when the three “non small” tourism countries (Jamaica, Jordan and 
Singapore) are added to the STC dummies regressions (4), (5) (as for regression (6) only small countries 
have an index of tourism specialization greater than 20%). 
  7faster growth path simply because they are poorer than average – a mechanism fully predicted 
by the traditional Solovian growth model. Possibilities of this type are controlled for in all 
regressions in Table 6, in which we adopt a Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) (M-R-W from now 
on) approach to the analysis of cross-country growth differentials. 8  Regressions (2) and (3) 
show that the STC dummy stays significant at the 1% confidence level even after other growth 
factors, such as the initial level of per capita GDP and an index of openness, are taken intro 
account. Adding an index of volatility does not alter this result (regressions (4) and (5)). 
  In regressions (6) and (7) we further test the presence of a growth-enhancing effect of 
tourism. In regression (6) we use the index of tourism specialization instead of the usual STC 
dummy. The index is significant at the 1% confidence level, and the value of its coefficient 
implies that an increase of 10% in the ratio of tourism receipts to GDP 9 is associated to an 
increase of 0.7% in the annual growth rate of per capita GDP.  
  Finally, in regression (7) we use a dummy-slope (the index of openness multiplied by 
the STC>10% dummy). The idea is to test whether being specialised in tourism generates a 
premium over the average positive effect of openness on growth. The answer is yes. The 
coefficient of the new interactive variable is significant and its value is large.  
 
  Another way to test whether factors other than tourism specialization are the source of 
the positive performance of STCs, is to consider how different STCs are from other small and 
larger countries in terms of a number of growth determinants.  In Table 7 we see that the 
reason why STCs are growing faster is not : 
(i)  that they are poorer than average (regr. (1): they are not);  
(ii)  that they have particularly high saving/investment propensities (regr. (2): other 
small countries save/invest more than STCs);  
(iii)  that they are open to trade (regr. (3): they are very open to trade, but not more than 
the other small, low-growth countries in the sample).  
In addition to this, we report that STCs are less subject to volatility in their growth 
rates than the other SCs and the Oil countries.  
  This further evidence confirms the results shown in our previous tables. The positive 
performance of STCs relative to that of the other groups is not significantly accounted for by 
the traditional growth factors of the M-R-W type models. Tourism specialization appears to be 
an independent determinant. 
                                                 
8 Human capital – a crucial variable in M-R-W – is not included in our regressions because data on six 
of our STCs are not available.  
9 In our sample of 143 countries, the standard deviation of this variable measured in percentage values 
is 9.0. 
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Table 5 
Growth and STCs – I 
Dependent variable: Average annual real per capita GDP growth, 1980-95 





































































2  0.399 0.418 0.436  0.433 
 
 
All regressions include a full set of regional dummies as 
defined in E-K.  Figures in brackets are t-statistics (standard 
errors are White-corrected). 




  9Table 6 
 
Growth and STCs - II 
Dependent variable: Average annual real per capita GDP growth, 1980-95 
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2  0.456 
 






All regressions include a full set of regional dummies as defined in E-K. Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
(standard errors are White-corrected). 
* Significant at 10%   ** Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 7 
 
Growth determinants and STCs  
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No. of obs  143  138  141 
 
143    
R




All regressions include a full set of regional dummies as defined in E-K. 
Figures in brackets are t-statistics (standard errors are White-corrected). 




5. STCs growth and heterogeneity 
How heterogeneous are the countries included in the STC “club” in terms of their growth 
performance?  Eleven of the fourteen STCs grow faster than the average in the sample (above 
0.4% per year); 10 eight of them show high growth performances (above 2.0% per year); three 
perform worse than average: Bermuda, the Bahamas and Vanuatu. The latter seems to 
                                                 
10 The annual growth rates of real per capita GDP (average 1980-95) in STCs are as follows: Samoa 
0.6%, Fiji 0.9%, Grenada 3.8%, Cyprus 4.3%, Malta 4.1%, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.7%, 
Vanuatu -0.1%, Seychelles 2.4%, Barbados 0.5%, Bermuda 0.2%, St. Kitts and Nevis 3.9%, St. Lucia 












  11represent a rather unique case. It is the only initially very poor STC to experience no growth. 
The other two bad performers are the richest in the group: in 1980 a resident in Bermuda (the 
Bahamas) was 9 (7.5) times richer than a resident in Vanuatu. Moreover, Vanuatu has also 
seen its index of tourism specialization fall during the period under analysis.  
To get an idea of the relative magnitude of the dispersion of growth rates across STCs, in 
Table 8 we compare the standard deviation of the growth rates of the various groups of 
countries. The standard deviation of STCs is higher than that of OECD countries, and is 
slightly lower than that of all the other groups and of the whole sample. 
 
        Table  8 
Countries  S.D. 
Growth 
OECD   0.008 
OIL  0.031 
Small  0.023 
Small Tour 10%  0.019 
LDCs  0.022 
All  0.024 
 
  Although explaining the observed dispersion in the growth rates of STCs is an 
interesting issue, it is well beyond the scope of the present paper.11 Among other things, a 
satisfactory answer should model, and test empirically, the widely different patterns of 
tourism development adopted by countries with a comparative advantage in this sector.12  
In this section we address a simpler and preliminary empirical question – namely, whether 
countries within the STCs group are becoming more or less homogeneous over time in terms of 
their growth rates and – perhaps – per capita GDP levels.  
A standard way of evaluating the pattern over time of a cross-country index of dispersion is 
the so-called σ -convergence analysis. Figure 2(a) shows the pattern of the coefficient of 
variation (%) within the STCs group from 1980 to 1995.13  σ -convergence was clearly at work 
between 1980 and 1990: the coefficient of variation decreases from 9.1% to 8.0%, and then it 
stays constant around this latter value.14 Again, this pattern differs sharply from the one 
                                                 
11 A preliminary discussion of why growth rates can differ between STCs and other countries, as well as 
across STCs, is postponed to section 6 below, where we compare alternative models of growth 
compatible with our evidence. 
12 For instance, a fast and intense use of the environment could generate a high but declining growth 
rate; viceversa, a less intense use of the environment could generate growth benefits in the longer run 
rather than soon. Moreover, destination countries could display some differences in the quality of the 
tourist services offered, whether in the form of more luxury accommodations or better preserved natural 
resources, which could match different paths of international demand growth. 
13 In Figure 2 we use the coefficient of variation instead of the standard deviation to control for the 
rather different averages in per capita income across the various groups of countries.  
14 In 1980 the same index was equal to 12.8% for the whole sample and to 4.0% for the OECD countries.  
  12characterizing the group of 15 non-tourism small countries (Figure 2(b)): here the level of the 
index of inequality is higher (11.8% in 1980) and, more importantly, it is characterized by a 
clear tendency to increase over time (12.5% in 1995). 
 
Figure 2. σ -convergence, 1980-95 
Coefficient of variation, logs of per capita income 
 

























































At this stage, it would be helpful to complement the above analysis by testing for the 
presence of β -convergence across the STCs.  However, we have too few cross-section 
observations (14) for a reliable estimate of a standard cross-country growth regression.15  
Keeping this shortcoming in mind, we report that a OLS regression between growth rates and 
the logs of the 1980 level of per capita GDP generates a negative (as expected) coefficient 
equal to –0.0111, significant at the 10% level (R2 = 0.189). Adding a dummy to control for 
Vanuatu, we obtain a coefficient equal to –0.0115, significant at the 1% level (R2 = 0.467).   
  It is also interesting to report that, underlying the observed per capita GDP 
convergence, some convergence also seems to be at work in tourism receipts per arrival. This 









                                                 
15  A dynamic panel estimate would be possible but it poses a sufficient number of econometric issues to 
deserve a paper on its own. Figure 3. σ -convergence, 1980-95 

























All in all, the evidence discussed in this section gives some support to the idea that a 
significant part of the observed heterogeneity within the STCs group might be based on a 
rather simple explanation: within this “club”, the dispersion of per capita GDP tends to 
decrease, with poorer countries growing faster the richer ones. At this stage of our research, 
we do not know how robust this finding is, as well as whether an absolute or conditional 
process of convergence is at work – if any. In 1985, the Maldives had a per capita GDP equal 
to 10% of that of the Bahamas; a decade later, the Maldives had doubled that initial relative 
value. Are they converging to the high per capita GDP of the Bahamas? Are most of STCs 
converging to that level?  If instead convergence is conditional rather than absolute, is the 
type of tourism development adopted in a country a relevant conditioning factor?  These 
questions are important and future research should pay them the attention they deserve. 
 
 
6.  Why are the STCs growing fast? 
Our evidence shows that tourism can be a growth-enhancing specialization, at least for the 
period under analysis. Is the above-described performance an episode or are we dealing with 
something of a more persistent nature? Understanding the mechanisms behind this 
phenomenon is important, especially from the viewpoint of economic policy. Taken at face 
value, our results seem to justify a rather optimistic perception of the economic consequences 
of specializing in tourism. This is not necessarily true. As a matter of fact, various 
interpretations are possible at this stage. In this section, we discuss explicitly two different 
mechanisms that could generate the above-described performance, and suggest what type of 
additional data will be required to identify their empirical relevance.   
A simple analytical setting within which the two hypotheses can be defined and 
compared is offered by Lanza and Pigliaru in a series of papers, (1994), (2000 a,b). In these 
  14papers Lucas’s (1988) two-sector endogenous growth model is shown to be simple and detailed 
enough for the analytical evaluation of the effects of tourism specialization.  
  Consider a world formed of a continuum of small countries characterized by a two-
sector economy (M for manufacturing, T for Tourism)  and total labour endowment L, in which 
the engine of growth – the accumulation of human capital – takes the exclusive form of 
learning-by-doing, so that pure competition prevails. While physical production in the 
manufacturing sector is determined by human capital only through its productivity effects on 
the labour force (LM) in the sector, production of T requires an additional input, a natural 
resource whose fixed endowment is R . This association with natural resources implies that 
each worker in the tourist sector must be endowed with (at least) a minimum quantity ρ  in 
order to make production of T feasible.  
The association between LT and R  also plays a role in determining the comparative 
advantage of individual countries. Countries with a small R  face constraints in the number of 
workers they can allocate to sector T ; no constraint exists in countries with larger R s. Given 
the mechanisms governing the determination of the relative price in autarchy, countries with 
larger   ( T L R ) will tend to develop a comparative advantage in T, while the opposite is true for 
countries with smaller   ( T L R ).16 Notice that, as far as small countries have higher than 
average R L, this result would be compatible with the stylized fact that T countries are 
generally small.17  
In each sector the potential for learning-by-doing is defined by a constant,  i λ . In our 
case, manufacturing is the "high technology" sector, so that    T λ λ > M .  Given that 
international trade will force all countries to specialize completely according to their 
comparative advantage, the (physical) growth rate of a country is consequently equal to 







, with i=T,M 
However,  international trade also affects the terms of trade ( M T p p p ≡ ). In particular, with 
Cobb-Douglas preferences, p  moves in favour of the slow-growing good exactly 
counterbalancing the growth differential between the two countries,  so that in the long run 
we should expect STCs  to grow at the same rate as industrialised countries.18 
                                                 
16 The details of the role played by are in generating the comparative advantage depends on the demand 
elasticity of substitution. See Lanza and Pigliaru (2000b). 
17 More on this in Lanza and Pigliaru (2000b)). 
18 In the more general case of CES preferences, the rate of change of p is equal to ( , where  )
1 − − σ λ λ T M σ  
is the elasticity of substitution,  so that the terms of trade effect will outweigh the productivity 
differential when σ  is smaller than unity (see Lanza and Pigliaru, 1994, 2000a,b) 
  15This holds by keeping the utilisation of the natural resource constant. Consider now a T 
country in which, at a certain point in time, not all R is used, so that ρ ρ < , where  R L ρ ≡  
is the upper limit of natural resource per worker in the event of complete specialization in T.  
If in this country the rate of utilization of its natural endowment increases, then its growth 
rate in terms of the manufacturing good is equal to 
 
(2)       TT yy p pρ ρ + +   . 
However, this growth rate can only be observed in the short-term. In the long-run, ρ ρ   tends 
to zero as the upper boundρ  is approached.  Consequently, in the long-run tourism 
specialization neutral for growth (unless the cases of σ  greater/smaller than 1 are 
considered). 
This simple analytical setting can be used to define alternative explanations of why 
STCs have grown faster. 
The pessimistic interpretation. International preferences are Cobb-Douglas (or CES with 
1 > σ ), so that the terms of trade effect cannot outweigh the productivity differential. In this 
case, other things being constant, the index of tourism specialization should play no role in our 
regressions (a negative role with  1 > σ ). If that is the case, a way to reconcile theory with our 
evidence  is that, perhaps, the rate of utilization of the natural endowment in STCs has 
increased significantly during the period under analysis ( 0 ρ ρ >  ), so that  
 (3)    TT yy p pρ ρ ++       > M M yy   ≥  TT yy p p +   
Clearly, with this additional term, the growth rate of a T country can be greater than  M M yy  , 
the growth rate of the average M  country. However, this performance can only be observed in 
the short-term. In the long-run, ρ ρ   tends to zero as the upper limitρ  is approached.  In this 
setting, in the long-run the T countries should not outperform the M countries. 
The optimistic interpretation. The second interpretation relies on a “terms of trade effect”. In 
words, tourism is not harmful for growth if the prevailing international terms of trade move 
fast enough to more than offset the gap in sectoral productivity growth. If this happens, the 
sum  TT yy p p +   would be persistently greater than  M M yy  . In terms of the model to which 
we have referred in this section,  1 σ <  is sufficient for this result to hold.19  Adding non-
homothetic preferences with T as the luxury good would yield further analytical support to the 
                                                 
19 For evidence favourable to this hypothesis, see Brau (1995), Lanza (1997) and Lanza, Urga and 
Temple (2003). 
  16possibility that the terms of trade move fast enough in favour of the T good 20 and, 
consequently, to an optimistic interpretation of our current evidence. In both cases we have: 
(4)   TT yy p pρ ρ ++       > TT yy p p +      > M M yy   
To sum up, we have “productivity pessimism” and “terms of trade optimism”. A growth episode 
based on a fast supply expansion in the T sector might temporarily hide the growth-neutral or 
even damaging nature of tourism specialization. On the other hand, consumer preferences 
might be such that tourism specialization (or some types of tourism specialization) is highly 
valued in the international marketplace. This second mechanism – not crucially based on 
output expansion – tends to make sustainability of tourism-based development easier to 
achieve.  
An important task for future research is to identify the relative importance of the various 
types of growth-enhancing mechanisms associated with tourism specialization, in order to 
assess their economic (and environmental) sustainability. Cross-country data on the dynamics 
of the terms of trade between tourism services and a composite other good are required, as 
well as data on the natural resource endowment and indexes of the latter’s degree of 
exploitation for tourism purposes. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Specializing in tourism is an option available to a number of less developed countries and 
regions, in which development through industrialization is not easy due to the existence of 
persistent gaps in technology levels.  
  Is tourism a good option? To answer this question, we have compared the relative 
growth performance of 14 “tourism countries” from a sample of 143 countries, observed during 
the 1980-95 period. We have documented that the STCs grow significantly faster than all the 
other sub-groups considered in our analysis (OECD, Oil, LDC, Small). Moreover, we have 
shown that the reason why they grow faster is not that they are poorer than average; that 
they have particularly high saving/investment propensities; that they are very open to trade. 
In other words, our findings point to the fact that the positive performance of STCs is not 
significantly accounted for by the traditional growth factors of the Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
type of models. Tourism specialization appears to be an independent determinant. 
  A corollary of our findings is that the role played by the tourism sector should not be 
ignored by the debate about whether smallness is harmful for growth (e.g. Easterly and Kraay 
(2000), who conclude that there is no growth disadvantage in smallness). Half of the thirty 
                                                 
20 See also Pigliaru (2002). 
  17countries classified as microstate in this literature are heavily dependent on tourism. Once 
this distinction is adopted, it is easy to see that the STCs perform much better than the 
remaining small countries. In our findings, smallness per se can be bad for growth, while the 
opposite is true when smallness goes together with tourism specialization. 
  Taken at face value, our results seem to justify a rather optimistic perception of the 
economic consequences of specializing in tourism. This is not necessarily true. As a matter of 
fact, various interpretations are possible at this stage. In section 7, we have discussed two 
alternative mechanisms that would be compatible with our empirical evidence. The first is 
based on a “terms of trade effect” which would allow STCs to enjoy sustainable fast growth in 
the long-run. The second implies a far less optimistic scenario: STCs can obtain fast growth for 
a period by accelerating the exploitation of the environment to which tourists are attracted. 
The long-run scenario might be very different, especially if the dynamics of sectoral 
productivities are in favour of high-tech industries, as suggested by much of the endogenous 
growth literature. 
  Identifying the relative strength of these mechanisms in explaining the positive 
performance of the STCs is an important task that we will deal with in future stages of our 
research.  
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Appendix: Data sources 
 
The Easterly-Kraay (E-K) “Small States dataset” 
 
This dataset consists of 157 countries for which at least 10 years of annual data on per capita 
GDP adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity are available. Among these countries 
33 are defined as small countries having an average population during 1960-95 of less than 
one million. Other variables include: 
 
a)  Regional Dummies (country selection from the World Bank World Tables (WB)) 
b)  Real GDP per capita measured in 1985 international dollars. (Source: Penn World 
Tables mark 5.6 (PWT)).  Missing observations in the PWT are filled where possible 
using PPP-adjusted GDP estimates reported by the WB. 
c)  For a more exhaustive description on data sources see p. 2027 of E-K (2000). 
 
The dataset used in this paper:  
 
Our dataset consists of 143 countries for which at least 10 years of annual data on per capita 
GDP adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity are available. A set of different 
dummies have been considered:  
 
a) According to population  
29 are Small Countries (average population during 1960-95 <1 million)   
 
 
b) According to Tourism specialization  
 
10 are Tourism Countries with a specialization >= 20%. (For a complete definition of 
specialization see below).  
13 are Tourism Countries with a specialization >= 15% 
17 are Tourism Countries with a specialization >= 10% 
3 countries among this group are not small (Jamaica, Singapore and Jordan) 
 
c) According to Tourism specialization and Population  
 
19 are Small not Tourism (specialization <= 20%) 
17 are Small not Tourism (specialization <= 15%) 
15 are Small not Tourism (specialization <= 10%) 
 
 
c) Other relevant dummies  
 
  2037 Less Developed Countries (of these, 6 Small  not Tour and 2 Small Tourism) 
21 OECD 
14 Oil  
 








1.  Real per capita GDP Levels (International Prices, base year 1985): Source: PWTables 
5.6. Missing observations from Global Development Finance and World Development 
Indicators.  
 
















This variable has been computed for 1960-95, 1980-95, 1960-80. 
 








)   prices market  at    GDP
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Source for both series (World Bank Development Indicators, current US$) 
This variable has been computed for 1960-95, 1980-95, 1960-80 
 
 







)   prices market  at    GDP
   Exports Imports
 
 
Source for both series (World Bank Development Indicators, current US$) 
This variable has been computed for 1960-95, 1980-95, 1960-80 
 
5.  Average Investments to GDP: Source: PWTables 5.6. The GDP values are PPP adjusted 
and the variables are computed for 1960-95, 1980-95, 1960-80. 
 
6.  Average Secondary School Enrolment rate: Secondary School enrolment rate (gross) 
(Source: WB Development indicators 2000) 
 
7.  Average Standard Deviation of Growth Rate: Growth rates of (2). 
 
 
The different subsets of countries are listed below: 
 




4  United Arab Emirates 
5 Congo,  Rep. 
6 Algeria 





12 Saudi  Arabia 










OECD   



















20 United  Kingdom 
21 United  States 
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23 Solomon  Islands 
24  St. Kitts and Nevis 
25 St.  Lucia 









4 Burkina  Faso 
5 Burundi 
6 Cape  Verde 




10  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
11 Djibouti 
12 Ethiopia 
13 Gambia,  The 
14 Guinea 
15 Haiti 












28 Sierra  Leone 
















  23 
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 
Our working papers are available on the Internet at the following addresses: 
                              http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html 
                       http://papers.ssrn.com 




SUST 1.2002  K. TANO, M.D. FAMINOW, M. KAMUANGA and B. SWALLOW: Using Conjoint Analysis to Estimate Farmers’ 
Preferences for Cattle Traits in West Africa 
ETA 2.2002  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Paolo SURICO: What Does Monetary Policy Reveal about Central Bank’s 
Preferences? 
WAT 3.2002  Duncan KNOWLER and Edward BARBIER: The Economics of a “Mixed Blessing” Effect: A Case Study of the 
Black Sea  
CLIM 4.2002  Andreas LöSCHEL: Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A Survey 
VOL 5.2002  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Stable Coalitions 
CLIM 6.2002  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Rockets and Feathers Revisited: An International 
Comparison on European Gasoline Markets 
ETA 7.2002  Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Eftichios S. SARTZETAKIS: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An 
Analytical Approach 
KNOW 8.2002  Alain DESDOIGTS: Neoclassical Convergence Versus Technological Catch-up: A Contribution for Reaching a 
Consensus 
NRM 9.2002  Giuseppe DI VITA: Renewable Resources and Waste Recycling 
KNOW 10.2002  Giorgio BRUNELLO:  Is Training More Frequent when Wage Compression is Higher? Evidence from 11 
European Countries 
ETA 11.2002  Mordecai KURZ, Hehui JIN and Maurizio MOTOLESE: Endogenous Fluctuations and the Role of Monetary 
Policy 
KNOW 12.2002  Reyer GERLAGH and Marjan W. HOFKES: Escaping Lock-in: The Scope for a Transition towards Sustainable 
Growth? 
NRM 13.2002  Michele MORETTO and Paolo ROSATO: The Use of Common Property Resources: A Dynamic Model 
CLIM 14.2002  Philippe QUIRION: Macroeconomic Effects of an Energy Saving Policy in the Public Sector 
CLIM 15.2002  Roberto ROSON: Dynamic and Distributional Effects of Environmental Revenue Recycling Schemes: 
Simulations with a General Equilibrium Model of the Italian Economy 
CLIM 16.2002  Francesco RICCI (l): Environmental Policy Growth when Inputs are Differentiated in Pollution Intensity 















20.2002  Guillaume HAERINGER (liv): On the Stability of Cooperation Structures 
NRM 21.2002  Fausto CAVALLARO and Luigi CIRAOLO: Economic and Environmental Sustainability: A Dynamic Approach 
in Insular Systems 
CLIM 22.2002  Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO, Igor CERSOSIMO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Back to Kyoto? US 
Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation 
CLIM 23.2002  Andreas LÖSCHEL and ZhongXIANG ZHANG: The Economic and Environmental Implications of the US 
Repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Subsequent Deals in Bonn and Marrakech 
ETA 24.2002  Marzio GALEOTTI, Louis J. MACCINI and Fabio SCHIANTARELLI: Inventories, Employment and Hours 
CLIM 25.2002  Hannes EGLI: Are Cross-Country Studies of the Environmental Kuznets Curve Misleading? New Evidence from 
Time Series Data for Germany 
ETA 26.2002  Adam B. JAFFE, Richard G. NEWELL and Robert N. STAVINS: Environmental Policy and Technological 
Change 
SUST 27.2002  Joseph C. COOPER and Giovanni SIGNORELLO: Farmer Premiums for the Voluntary Adoption of 
Conservation Plans 
SUST 28.2002  The ANSEA Network: Towards An Analytical Strategic Environmental Assessment  
KNOW 29.2002  Paolo SURICO: Geographic Concentration and Increasing Returns: a Survey of Evidence 
ETA 30.2002    Robert N. STAVINS: Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies NRM 31.2002  Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Multi-Criteria Analysis and Decision-Support for Water Management at 
the Catchment Scale: An Application to Diffuse Pollution Control in the Venice Lagoon 
NRM 32.2002  Robert N. STAVINS: National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years 
KNOW 33.2002  A. SOUBEYRAN and H. STAHN : Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good 
Industries? 
KNOW 34.2002  G. BRUNELLO, M.L. PARISI and Daniela SONEDDA: Labor Taxes, Wage Setting and the Relative Wage 
Effect 
CLIM 35.2002  C. BOEMARE and P. QUIRION (lv): Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: Lessons from 
Economic Theory and International Experiences 
CLIM 36.2002  T.TIETENBERG (lv): The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned? 
    CLIM   37.2002  K. REHDANZ and R.J.S. TOL (lv): On National and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits 
    CLIM   38.2002  C. FISCHER (lv): Multinational Taxation and International Emissions Trading 
    SUST   39.2002  G. SIGNORELLO and G. PAPPALARDO: Farm Animal Biodiversity Conservation Activities in Europe under 
the Framework of Agenda 2000 
    NRM   40.2002  S .M. CAVANAGH, W. M. HANEMANN and R. N. STAVINS: Muffled Price Signals: Household Water Demand 
under Increasing-Block Prices 
    NRM   41.2002  A. J.  PLANTINGA, R. N. LUBOWSKI and R. N. STAVINS: The Effects of Potential Land Development on 
Agricultural Land Prices 
    CLIM   42.2002  C. OHL (lvi): Inducing Environmental Co-operation by the Design of Emission Permits 
    CLIM   43.2002  J. EYCKMANS, D. VAN REGEMORTER and V. VAN STEENBERGHE (lvi): Is Kyoto Fatally Flawed? An 
Analysis with MacGEM 
    CLIM   44.2002  A. ANTOCI and S. BORGHESI (lvi): Working Too Much in a Polluted World: A North-South Evolutionary 
Model 
    ETA   45.2002  P. G. FREDRIKSSON, Johan A. LIST and Daniel MILLIMET (lvi): Chasing the Smokestack: Strategic 
Policymaking with Multiple Instruments 
   ETA  46.2002  Z. YU  (lvi):  A Theory of Strategic Vertical  DFI and the Missing  Pollution-Haven Effect 
   SUST  47.2002  Y. H. FARZIN: Can an Exhaustible Resource Economy  Be Sustainable? 
   SUST  48.2002  Y. H. FARZIN: Sustainability and  Hamiltonian Value 
   KNOW  49.2002  C. PIGA and M. VIVARELLI: Cooperation in R&D and Sample Selection 
   Coalition 
   Theory 
   Network 
50.2002  M. SERTEL and A. SLINKO (liv): Ranking Committees,  Words or Multisets 
   Coalition 
   Theory 
   Network 
51.2002  Sergio CURRARINI (liv): Stable Organizations with Externalities 
   ETA  52.2002  Robert N. STAVINS: Experience with Market-Based Policy Instruments 
   ETA  53.2002  C.C. JAEGER, M. LEIMBACH, C. CARRARO, K. HASSELMANN, J.C. HOURCADE, A. KEELER and  
R. KLEIN (liii): Integrated Assessment Modeling: Modules for Cooperation 
   CLIM  54.2002  Scott BARRETT (liii): Towards a Better Climate Treaty 
   ETA  55.2002  Richard G. NEWELL and Robert N. STAVINS:  Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-
Based Policies 
   SUST  56.2002  Paolo ROSATO and Edi DEFRANCESCO: Individual Travel Cost Method and Flow Fixed Costs   
   SUST  57.2002  Vladimir KOTOV and Elena NIKITINA (lvii): Reorganisation of Environmental Policy in Russia: The Decade of 
Success and Failures in Implementation of Perspective Quests 
   SUST  58.2002  Vladimir KOTOV (lvii): Policy in Transition: New Framework for Russia’s Climate Policy 
   SUST  59.2002  Fanny MISSFELDT and Arturo VILLAVICENCO (lvii): How Can Economies in Transition Pursue Emissions 
Trading or Joint Implementation? 
   VOL  60.2002  Giovanni DI BARTOLOMEO, Jacob ENGWERDA, Joseph PLASMANS and Bas VAN AARLE: Staying Together 
or Breaking Apart: Policy-Makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary 
Union  
   ETA  61.2002  Robert N. STAVINS, Alexander F.WAGNER and Gernot WAGNER: Interpreting Sustainability in Economic 
Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity 
   PRIV  62.2002  Carlo CAPUANO: Demand Growth, Entry and Collusion Sustainability 
   PRIV  63.2002  Federico MUNARI and Raffaele ORIANI: Privatization and R&D Performance: An Empirical Analysis Based on 
Tobin’s Q 
   PRIV  64.2002  Federico MUNARI and Maurizio SOBRERO: The Effects of Privatization on R&D Investments and Patent 
Productivity 
   SUST  65.2002  Orley ASHENFELTER and Michael GREENSTONE: Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the Value of a 
Statistical Life 
   ETA  66.2002  Paolo SURICO:  US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences 
   PRIV  67.2002  Rinaldo BRAU and Massimo FLORIO: Privatisations as Price Reforms: Evaluating Consumers’ Welfare 
Changes in the U.K. 
   CLIM  68.2002  Barbara K. BUCHNER and Roberto ROSON: Conflicting Perspectives in Trade and Environmental Negotiations
   CLIM  69.2002  Philippe QUIRION: Complying with the Kyoto Protocol under Uncertainty:  Taxes or Tradable  Permits? 
   SUST  70.2002  Anna ALBERINI, Patrizia RIGANTI  and Alberto LONGO: Can People Value the Aesthetic and Use Services of 
Urban Sites? Evidence from a Survey of Belfast Residents 
   SUST  71.2002  Marco PERCOCO:  Discounting Environmental Effects in Project Appraisal    NRM  72.2002  Philippe BONTEMS and Pascal FAVARD: Input Use and Capacity Constraint under Uncertainty: The Case of 
Irrigation 
   PRIV  73.2002  Mohammed OMRAN: The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises and Newly Privatized Firms: Empirical 
Evidence from Egypt 
   PRIV  74.2002  Mike BURKART, Fausto PANUNZI and Andrei SHLEIFER: Family Firms 
   PRIV  75.2002  Emmanuelle AURIOL, Pierre M. PICARD:  Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Government Budget 
Constraint  
   PRIV  76.2002  Nichole M. CASTATER:  Privatization as a Means to Societal Transformation: An Empirical Study of 
Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
   PRIV  77.2002  Christoph LÜLSFESMANN: Benevolent Government, Managerial Incentives, and the Virtues of Privatization 
   PRIV  78.2002  Kate BISHOP, Igor FILATOTCHEV and Tomasz MICKIEWICZ: Endogenous Ownership Structure: Factors 
Affecting the Post-Privatisation Equity in Largest Hungarian Firms   
   PRIV  79.2002  Theodora WELCH and Rick MOLZ: How Does Trade Sale Privatization Work? 
Evidence from the Fixed-Line Telecommunications Sector in Developing Economies 
   PRIV  80.2002  Alberto R. PETRUCCI: Government Debt, Agent Heterogeneity and Wealth Displacement in a Small Open 
Economy 
   CLIM  81.2002  Timothy SWANSON and Robin MASON (lvi): The Impact of International Environmental Agreements: The Case 
of the Montreal Protocol 
   PRIV  82.2002  George R.G. CLARKE and Lixin Colin XU: Privatization, Competition and Corruption: How Characteristics of 
Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribe Payments to Utilities 
   PRIV  83.2002  Massimo FLORIO and Katiuscia MANZONI: The Abnormal Returns of UK Privatisations: From Underpricing 
to Outperformance 
   NRM  84.2002  Nelson LOURENÇO, Carlos RUSSO MACHADO, Maria do ROSÁRIO JORGE and Luís RODRIGUES: An 
Integrated Approach to Understand Territory Dynamics. The Coastal Alentejo (Portugal)  
   CLIM  85.2002  Peter ZAPFEL and Matti VAINIO (lv): Pathways to European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading History and 
Misconceptions 
   CLIM  86.2002  Pierre COURTOIS: Influence Processes in Climate Change Negotiations: Modelling the Rounds 
   ETA  87.2002  Vito FRAGNELLI and Maria Erminia MARINA (lviii): Environmental Pollution Risk and Insurance 
   ETA  88.2002  Laurent FRANCKX (lviii): Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring 
   ETA  89.2002  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy M. SWANSON (lviii): Lost Horizons. The noncooperative management of an 
evolutionary biological system. 
   ETA  90.2002  Hans KEIDING (lviii): Environmental Effects of Consumption: An Approach Using DEA and Cost Sharing 
   ETA  91.2002  Wietze LISE (lviii): A Game Model of People’s Participation in Forest Management in Northern India  
   CLIM  92.2002  Jens HORBACH: Structural Change and Environmental Kuznets Curves 
   ETA  93.2002  Martin P. GROSSKOPF: Towards a More Appropriate Method for Determining the Optimal Scale of Production 
Units 
   VOL  94.2002  Scott BARRETT and Robert STAVINS: Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change 
Agreements 
   CLIM  95.2002  Banu BAYRAMOGLU LISE and Wietze LISE: Climate Change, Environmental NGOs and Public Awareness in 
the Netherlands: Perceptions and Reality  
   CLIM  96.2002  Matthieu GLACHANT: The Political Economy of Emission Tax Design in Environmental Policy 
   KNOW  97.2002  Kenn ARIGA and Giorgio BRUNELLO: Are the More Educated Receiving More Training? Evidence from 
Thailand 
   ETA  98.2002  Gianfranco FORTE and Matteo MANERA: Forecasting Volatility in European Stock Markets with Non-linear 
GARCH Models 
   ETA  99.2002  Geoffrey HEAL: Bundling Biodiversity 
   ETA  100.2002  Geoffrey HEAL, Brian WALKER, Simon LEVIN, Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA, Gretchen DAILY, Paul 
EHRLICH, Karl-Goran MALER, Nils KAUTSKY, Jane LUBCHENCO, Steve SCHNEIDER and David 
STARRETT:  Genetic Diversity and Interdependent Crop Choices in Agriculture 
   ETA  101.2002  Geoffrey HEAL: Biodiversity and Globalization 
   VOL  102.2002  Andreas LANGE: Heterogeneous International Agreements – If per capita emission levels matter 
   ETA  103.2002  Pierre-André JOUVET and Walid OUESLATI: Tax Reform and Public Spending Trade-offs in an Endogenous 
Growth Model with Environmental Externality 
   ETA  104.2002  Anna BOTTASSO and Alessandro SEMBENELLI: Does Ownership Affect Firms’ Efficiency? Panel Data 
Evidence on Italy 
   PRIV  105.2002  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI, Frank DE JONG, Giovanna NICODANO and Ibolya SCHINDELE: Privatization and 
Stock Market Liquidity  
   ETA  106.2002  Haruo IMAI and Mayumi HORIE (lviii): Pre-Negotiation for an International Emission Reduction Game 
   PRIV  107.2002  Sudeshna GHOSH BANERJEE and Michael C. MUNGER: Move to Markets? An Empirical Analysis of 
Privatisation in Developing Countries 
   PRIV  108.2002  Guillaume GIRMENS and Michel GUILLARD: Privatization and Investment: Crowding-Out Effect vs Financial 
Diversification 
   PRIV  109.2002  Alberto CHONG and Florencio LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES: Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring Around the 
World 
   PRIV  110.2002  Nandini GUPTA: Partial Privatization and Firm Performance 
   PRIV  111.2002  François DEGEORGE, Dirk JENTER, Alberto MOEL and Peter TUFANO: Selling Company Shares to 
Reluctant Employees: France Telecom’s Experience    PRIV  112.2002  Isaac OTCHERE: Intra-Industry Effects of Privatization Announcements: Evidence from Developed and 
Developing Countries 
   PRIV  113.2002  Yannis KATSOULAKOS and Elissavet LIKOYANNI: Fiscal and Other Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization 
   PRIV  114.2002  Guillaume GIRMENS: Privatization, International Asset Trade and Financial Markets 
   PRIV  115.2002  D. Teja FLOTHO: A Note on Consumption Correlations and European Financial Integration 
   PRIV  116.2002  Ibolya SCHINDELE and Enrico C. PEROTTI: Pricing Initial Public Offerings in Premature Capital Markets: 
The Case of Hungary 
   PRIV  1.2003  Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical 
Issues 
   PRIV  2.2003  Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review 
   PRIV  3.2003  Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity 
Market 
   CLIM  4.2003  Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of 
Government Commitment 
   KNOW  5.2003  Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition 
   ETA  6.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model 
   SIEV  7.2003  Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The 
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: 
Evidence from Surveys of Developers 
   NRM  8.2003  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse? 
   CLIM  9.2003  A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game 
with Asymmetric Information 
   KNOW  10.2003  Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy  
   CLIM  11.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of 
Climate Change Policy Analysis 
   KNOW  12.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural 
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art 
   KNOW  13.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological 
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures  
   KNOW  14.2003  Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and 
Future Trajectories 
   KNOW  15.2003  Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and 
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life  
   KNOW  16.2003  Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from 
Slovakia 
   KNOW  17.2003  Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community 




19.2003  Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities 
PRIV 20.2003  Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale 
PRIV 21.2003  Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation 
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 
PRIV 22.2003  Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions  
PRIV 23.2003  David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies 
PRIV 24.2003  Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment 
PRIV 25.2003  Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in 
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions 
PRIV 26.2003  Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs 
PRIV 27.2003  Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 
PRIV 28.2003  Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative 
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts 
PRIV 29.2003  TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment  
PRIV 30.2003  Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities 
ETA 31.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive 
Externality NTU-Coalition Games  
KNOW 32.2003  Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_  
PRIV 33.2003  Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture? 
KNOW 34.2003  Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A 
Treatment Effect Analysis 
ETA 35.2003  Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different 




 GG 36.2003  Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats  
PRIV 37.2003  Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate 
Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection 
CLIM 38.2003  Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers 
KNOW 39.2003  Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade 
CTN 40.2003  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations 
KNOW 41.2003  Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply 
KNOW 42.2003  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing 
Biotechnologies 
ETA 43.2003  Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific 
Basin Region, Japan and US  
CLIM 44.2003  Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its 
Effectiveness 
PRIV 45.2003  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization 
SIEV 46.2003  Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste 
Disposal Methods 
ETA 47.2003  Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical 
Results for Germany 
CLIM 48.2003  Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology 
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing 
CLIM 49.2003  Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting 
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits 
CTN 50.2003  László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension 
 
CTN 51.2003  Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games 
CTN 52.2003  Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
CTN 53.2003  Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach 
CTN 54.2003  Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 
CTN 55.2003  Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks 
CTN 56.2003  Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization 
CTN 57.2003    Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International 
Environmental Agreements 
KNOW 58.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A 
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research 
KNOW 59.2003    Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change 
ETA 60.2003  Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey 
CLIM 61.2003  Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel 
Formation Game 
GG 62.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of 
International Environmental Agreements 
SIEV 63.2003  Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy 
CLIM 64.2003  Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of 
Global Climate Policy Architectures 
SIEV 65.2003  Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy 
SIEV 66.2003  Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the 
Environment 
SIEV 67.2003  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam 
Fishing Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise 
CLIM 68.2003  ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply 
with its Kyoto Target  
KNOW 69.2003  David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation 
KNOW 70.2003  Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History 
KNOW 71.2003  Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects? 
KNOW 72.2003  Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a 
Multicultural Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case  
KNOW 73.2003  Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of 
Globalisation and Migration 
KNOW 74.2003  Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication 
KNOW 75.2003  Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese 
in Portugal 




KNOW 77.2003  Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities 
KNOW 78.2003  Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of 
the Dilemmas 
KNOW 79.2003  Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and 
Resistance to Change  
ETA 80.2003  Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value 
under Profit Sharing Regulation 
IEM 81.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in 
International Petroleum Markets 
CLIM 82.2003  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against 
Environmental Regulation 
CLIM 83.2003  Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve? 
CLIM 84.2003  Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes 
NRM 85.2003  Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries 
Growing? The cross-country evidence 





(l) This paper was presented at the Workshop “Growth, Environmental Policies and Sustainability” 
organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, June 1, 2001  
 
(li) This paper was presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource 
Economics on “Property Rights, Institutions and Management of Environmental and Natural 
Resources”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, IDEI and INRA and sponsored by MATE, 
Toulouse, May 3-4, 2001  
 
(lii) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Economic Valuation of 
Environmental Goods”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in cooperation with CORILA, 
Venice, May 11, 2001 
 
(liii) This paper was circulated at the International Conference on “Climate Policy – Do We Need a 
New Approach?”, jointly organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Stanford University and 
Venice International University, Isola di San Servolo, Venice, September 6-8, 2001  
 
(liv) This paper was presented at the Seventh Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  and the CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Venice, Italy, 
January 11-12, 2002 
 
(lv) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of the Concerted Action on Tradable Emission 
Permits (CATEP) organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, Italy, December 3-4, 2001 
 
(lvi) This paper was presented at the ESF EURESCO Conference on Environmental Policy in a 
Global Economy “The International Dimension of Environmental Policy”, organised with the 
collaboration of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei , Acquafredda di Maratea, October 6-11, 2001  
 
(lvii) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of “CFEWE – Carbon Flows between Eastern 
and Western Europe”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Zentrum fur Europaische 
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Milan, July 5-6, 2001  
 
(lviii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Game Practice and the Environment”, jointly 
organised by Università del Piemonte Orientale and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Alessandria, 
April 12-13, 2002 
 
(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002   
 
(lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002 
 
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003    
 
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in 








CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
 
VOL  Voluntary and International Agreements (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
SUST  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation  
(Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
 
KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Dino Pinelli) 
 
MGMT  Corporate Sustainable Management (Editor: Andrea Marsanich) 
 
PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
 








CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
 
GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation  
(Editor: Anna Alberini) 
 
NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
 
KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
 
IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
 
CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
 
PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
 
ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 